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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

APPEAL BRIEF

Plaintiff/Appellee,
-vs-

Case No. 940426CA

TONYA VIGIL,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from convictions of theft by deception, both
second degree felonies. Utah CPfle Anru, §78-2a-3(2)(f), provides
this Court's jurisdiction over this case.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the trial court conduct an inadequate voir dire?

STANDARD OP REVIEW:
This Court reviews a trial court's performance of jury
voir dire for

abuse of discretion.

201, 205 (Utah App. 1992).

State v. Ontiveros. 835 P.2d

"Whether a trial court abused its

discretion in conducting voir dire depends on whether, 'considering

the totality of the questioning, counsel was afforded an adequate
opportunity to acquire the information necessary to evaluate
[prospective jurors.]'w

Id.

(citation omitted; brackets by the

Court).
The issue was preserved by trial counsels' pre-submitted
voir dire questions, and objection to the trial court's failures to
ask requested questions. (R.709,710,718,719,725).
1.

Did

the

trial

court

give

the

jury

an

erroneous

reviews this as a question of

law, for

instruction?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
The Court
correctness*

Ontiveros.

SUETA*

The

court

reviews

"jury

instructions in their entirety and will affirm when the jury
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law
applicable to the case." J&.

(citation omitted)*

This issue was preserved by trial counsels' objections.
(R.1164-1171)•
3.

Did the trial court err in blocking the presentation of

defense evidence and in denying jury instructions requested by the
defense?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
The jury instruction aspect of this issue is reviewed for
correction of error*

Ontiveros. siUBCa- As to the evidence aspect
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of this issue, the record must show a clear abuse of discretion.
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994).
The issue was preserved by trial counsels' objections to
the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury, and by trial
counsels' efforts to present the evidence.

(R.1151-1158; 1164-

1171).
4.

Was trial counsel ineffective in failing to request

proper defense instructions, and/or did the trial court commit
plain error in failing to give these instructions?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
Because the trial court was not presented the issue, this
Court must determine whether trial counsel was ineffective as a
matter of law. Salt Lake City v. Grotespas. 874 P.2d 136,138 (Utah
App. 1994).

Review of trial counsels' performance is to be

"'highly deferential'11 and is to avoid "'distorting effects of
hindsight.'"

I&.

(citations omitted).

In assessing ineffective assistance, this Court should
determine whether the errors below were both obvious and harmful.

State Yt Blflretige, 773 p.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 s.ct. 62
(1989).

This Court has the discretion to dispense with the

obviousness reguirement where the error was harmful in retrospect,
but may not have been readily apparent to the trial court and
counsel.

Id-# 773 P.2d at 35 and n.7.

3

See also State v. Verde.

770 P.2d 116,122 (Utah 1989) (applying plain error standard to
failure to given jury instructions sua sponte). The issue was not
raised below.
5.

Did the trial court err in its interpretation of the

statutes governing this case, in concluding that the facts alleged
here could constitute theft by deception?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:
"The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's
interpretation of statutory law is correction of error." State v>.
jlamss, 819 P.2d 781,796 (Utah 1991).
This issue was properly preserved by trial counsels'
motions to quash the bindover orders and notions to dismiss the
case.

(R.19-60; 183-233; 560; 1052-1053).

PJEEBBJgllATIVB CQMSTITUTIQMAL AMD STAHaSBX PROYISIQHS
The following statutory provision may be determinative in this
appeal:

Utah Code Ann. §76-7-203.

STATBIBHT OF THE CASB
The

State

of

Utah

charged

Tonya

Vigil

(hereinafter

"defendant") with two counts of theft by deception. Kenneth Brown
represented defendant in trial.

(R.13; 175). The case was bound

over to district court, and defendant entered a plea of not guilty
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to all charges.

(R.17; 181).

Defendant moved to quash the

bindover orders (R.19-69; 183-233; 560), and the trial court denied
the motions-

(R.82; 261; 582).

Defendant moved to sever the two counts in the two district
court cases. The State opposed this motion (R.252-260), and moved
to join both cases against defendant in a trial on similar cases
filed against defendant's husband, Thomas M. Vigil. (R.75-81; 245251).

The trial court joined all counts and cases against both

these defendants together for one trial.

(R.261, 585-586).

The jury convicted defendant as charged.

(R.393-394; 397)*

The trial judge sentenced defendant to serve two concurrent
terms one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison, suspended the
sentence and placed defendant on probation subject to a six-month
jail term.
From this conviction, defendant filed a timely appeal. (R.531
and 476).
After the notice of appeal was filed, a conflict of interest
caused Mr. Brown to withdraw as counsel, and Mary C. Corporon now
represents Tonya Vigil on appeal.

STATEMENT OP FACTS
DEFENSE CASS
Thomas and Tonya Vigil were married and living with five
5

children in their home as of the summer of 1992. Tonya went to her
physician for a tubal ligation and discovered she was pregnant.
Because the Vigils were financially destitute, they decided to give
up the expected child for adoption.

The Vigils made arrangements

to give up the unborn baby for adoption to three separate families,
the Elizondos, the Bushmans, and the Hallidays.

During the course

of the transactions, all the prospective adoptive parents gave the
Vigils money for expenses.
for

adoption

to

the

The Vigils did not give up their child

Elizondo

couple

because

the

Vigils

had

disagreements and difficulties with the attorney representing the
Elizondos.

The Vigils did not give up their child for adoption to

the Bushman couple because of difficulties with Mr. Bushman, mainly
because Mr. Bushman told them that he had decided not to adopt the
child himself.

The Vigils did not give up their child for adoption

to the Hallidays because, after the child was born, they could not
part with her.

The Vigils kept their baby.

They did not inform

any of the couples when she was born, and did not inform any of the
couples that they were receiving expense money from other couples.
(R.1062-1151).

STATE CASE
ft\iffti»nffi
Rex Bushman was an adoption attorney whom Tonya Vigil called
to arrange the adoption.

When the Vigils met with him in person on
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February 28, 1993, he drafted and they signed a document indicating
that he would find a family to adopt their baby.

He asked the

Vigils if his own family might adopt their child, and they agreed.
He offered to pay for medical expenses and they agreed. He drafted
and they signed an agreement for the payment of maternity expenses
on March 5, 1995. The agreement indicated that they would return
the expense money in the event that the adoption did not go
through.

He also drafted and they signed a form purporting to

waive any conflict of interest stemming from his dual roles as
their attorney and an adoptive parent.

(R.754-761).

About March 3, 1993, Mr. Vigil called Mr. Bushman twice,
indicating the Vigils' need for living expenses of approximately
$1,500. Mr. Bushman had agreed to pay $500 in living expenses, and
then agreed in writing to pay them $1,000 after their consent to
the adoption was final.

Mr. Bushman wrote a check for $390 for

their rent, and a check to Mrs. Vigil for $110.

(R.761-766).

Mr. Bushman maintained contact with the Vigils, but had
decided not to adopt the Vigil baby.

Sometime after March 19,

1993, Mrs. Vigil told him the adoption was still on.

He called

again later and found that the telephone had been disconnected, and
he called the police.

The adoption never went through, and the

Vigils never repaid Mr. Bushman the $500.

(R.766-769).

Mr. Bushman testified that he would not have paid the Vigils

7

$500 if he had not intended to obtain the baby.

When asked if he

considered the money a gift or charitable donation, he indicated
that he found that idea "preposterous.11 He also testified that he
would not have given the Vigils the $500 if he had known that other
people were paying the Vigils in anticipation of adopting the baby.
(R.769).

The Blizanflpg:
The Elizondos were attempting to adopt a child through an
attorney named John Giffen.

Thier legal contacts informed them

that the Vigils had an interest in having them adopt their child,
so Mr. Elizondo called Mrs. Vigil on the telephone in October of
1992,

when she was living with her mother. After further telephone

contact with Mrs. Vigil, Mr. Elizondo arranged to pay $500 a month
for her pregnancy expenses through Mr. Giffen's office.

He paid

$1,200 to get Mrs. Vigil into an apartment in November of 1992, and
paid a total of $4,300. John Giffen testified the vigils received
about $5,300. The Elizondos flew to Salt Lake City from their home
in California to visit the Vigils in February.

Mrs. Vigil told

them the baby was due in March, and forms she filled out for Mr.
Giffen specified March 27, 1993 as the due date. (R. 879-895; 927;
975-976).
Later in February, Thomas Vigil called Mr. Elizondo and asked
him to change attorneys because Mr. Vigil was not happy with John
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Giffen.

The Vigils did not like the way the money was being

managed, and wanted it to come directly to Mr. Vigil. John Giffen
confirmed that Mr. Vigil had had disagreements with him because Mr.
Vigil wanted more money and wanted the money sent to him.

There

was also a problem because Mr. Giffen's assistant did not obtain
medication necessary to treat Mrs. Vigil.

(R.889; 905-907; 914;

918; 954-955; 958; 1010).
Mr. Elizondo maintained contact with the Vigils in March of
1993, until their telephone was disconnected.

He later learned

through Mr. Giffen's assistant that the Vigils had had the baby on
March 18, 1993, and had decided to keep her. (R.895-897, 908).
Mr.

Elizondo

testified

that he knew that there was no

guarantee that the adoption would go through, that he did not
consider the money he paid to be a charitable contribution, that he
would not have paid them had he known that others were paying them
at the same time, and that he never got any money back from the
Vigils.

(R.897-898; 913).

He had a civil lawsuit pending against the Vigils, which was
filed by Paul Halliday, as of the date of trial.

(R.921).

The Hallidays;
Paul and Vicky Halliday were working through an attorney,
Marilyn Fineshriber, to adopt a child.

Mrs. Vigil had originally

contacted their attorney about the prospective adoption on March 3
9

or 4, and the Vigils met with the attorney on March 7 or 8, 1993.
Mrs. Vigil said the prospective due date for the birth of the child
was August 28, 1993. Mr. Halliday made arrangements to pay $900 in
expenses to the Vigils on March 12, 1993, after Mrs. Vigil told the
attorney on March 7, 1993, that the Vigils were about to be
evicted, and another $600 on March 25 or 26, 1993, in response to
Mr. Vigil#s call to the attorney indicating that the Vigils'
telephone had been disconnected and that they needed money to pay
their utilities.

The receipts for the checks to the Vigils from

the law firm state that the payments were charitable donations.
Mrs. Vigil told the attorney on March 23, 1993, that the Vigils
were planning to go through with the adoption.
not adopt the Vigil baby.

The Hallidays did

(R.803-810; 821-836; 860; 868).

Mr. Halliday testified that he did not consider the $1,500 a
gift to the Vigils, that he was not repaid by the Vigils, and that
he would not have paid the money had he known that they would not
receive the baby or that other people were also trying to adopt the
baby.

(R.810-811).

Mr. Halliday admitted on cross-examination that his attorney
had informed him that the $1,500 was a charitable contribution, and
that the money did not guarantee the adoption would go through (R.
815).
Vigils.

He testified that he had a civil suit pending against the
(R.818).
10

Mr. Vigil called the Hallidays' attorney on April 6, 1993, and
told her that they had not intended to defraud anyone, but had
decided to keep the baby, and would pay back the money.

He also

told her that a California couple had just offered to pay their
expenses, and that he had made no commitment to give the child up
for adoption.

(R. 867).

LEgAL ADVICE TQ THE VISILS
Marilyn Fineshriber, the Hallidays' attorney, testified that
she told the Vigils the money from the Hallidays was a charitable
contribution, and legally could not bind their consent to the
adoption.

(R.848-849; 864).

John Giffen, the attorney representing the Elizondos and the
Vigils, informed all parties that the money from the Elizondos did
not buy the consent

to the adoption, but was considered a

charitable contribution.

He gave the Vigils a form detailing

adoption-related crimes under California law, which indicated that
it is a crime to receive pregnancy expenses with the intent to
withhold consent to the adoption. He testified that in going over
the form he drafted entitled "Pitfalls of Adoption" regarding
various provisions of California law, he told the Vigils that it
was illegal to accept money from other couples, and explained that
Utah law is similar to California's, and counseled them about the
vulnerable emotional state of the prospective adoptive parents.

11

(R.930-932; 992).
Mrs. Vigil testified that John Giffen did not go over the
forms with them, or advise them about any legal issues surrounding
adoption, but sent his non-law-trained assistant to bring the
Vigils the forms.

(R.1121-1122).

SUMMARY OF AROTHEHT
A new trial is required because the voir dire in the instant
case did not provide trial counsel with adequate information with
which to assess the prospective jurors. The trial court's failure
to ask the jurors about their fairness and impartiality, about
their independence in deliberations, and about the impact of their
exposure

to

media

reports

concerning

attempted

adoptions,

constituted an abuse of discretion.
The trial court erred in giving the jury an instruction which
purported to carve out a theft by deception exception from the
statute which mandates that all monies given to birth parents by
prospective

adoptive

parents

be

charitable

donations.

The

instruction was inconsistent with Utah statutes and cases, and was
prejudicial to defendant.
The trial court erred in blocking defendant's presentation of
her defense evidence pertinent to her motivation in seeking out
successive prospective adoptive couples. The court compounded the

12

error

by

refusing

her

requested

defense

instructions

which

elucidated her motivation for seeking out multiple prospective
adoptive couples.
Trial counsel and the trial court prejudiced defendant's
defense by failing to give two jury instructions established by
statute, which would have provided defenses to her actions.
The trial court erred in ruling that charitable contributions
by prospective adoptive parents can be the object of theft by
deception charges.

This Court should resolve this issue by

ordering the case dismissed.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
A.

THE INADEQUATE VOIR DIRE REQUIRES A MEW TRIAL.
TRIAL COURTS MUST CONDUCT ADEQUATE VOIR DIRE.

The state and federal constitutions require trial courts
insure fair trials by conducting sufficient voir dire. E.g. State
v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 448 and nn. 1-6 (Utah 1988) (citing Article
I, sections 7, 10 and 12 of the Utah constitution, and the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution), reversed

on other grounds, State v, Menzies, 889 p.2d 393 (Utah 1994). The
Utah Supreme Court has exercised its supervisory power to reiterate
to the trial courts that it is their responsibility to insure that
voir dire proceedings not only provide adequate information for the
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informed exercise of peremptory challenges, but also eliminate bias
and prejudice from criminal trials. State v. James. 819 P.2d 781,
797-798 (Utah 1991).

In iamss, the Court directed trial courts to

go beyond the minimally adequate voir dire required by federal
constitutional standards, to thoroughly detect and probe juror
biases. !£. See also State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844-45 (Utah
1988); State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055, 1058-1061 (Utah 1984)•
"[T]he fairness of a trial may depend on the right of counsel
to ask voir dire questions designed to discover attitudes and
biases, both conscious and subconscious, even though they 'would
not have supported a challenge for cause.' All that is necessary
for a voir dire question to be appropriate is that it allow
' defense

counsel

intelligently.'»

to

exercise

peremptory

State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d

challenges

more

839, 845 (Utah

1988)(citation omitted).
Utah

Code Ann.

§77-1-6(1) (f) codifies the

right

to an

impartial jury, and Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure. 18(e)(14),
requires trial courts to conduct voir dire proceedings adequate to
reveal juror bias.

The rule provides that a juror should be

removed for cause if voir dire indicates "that a state of mind
exists on the part of the juror with reference to the cause, or to
either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and
without

prejudice

to

the

substantial

14

rights

of

the

party

challenging[.]M
Trial courts carry a heavy responsibility in conducting voir
dire in criminal cases. Mu'Min v. Virginia. 114 L.Ed.2d 493, 501510 (1991); State v. James. 819 P.2d 781, 797-98 (Utah 1991).

B.

THE VOIR DIRE
INADEQUATE.

IN THIS CASE WAS

After the initial round of voir dire, the trial court held a
hearing outside the jury's presence, wherein defense counsel asked
the trial court to ask the following pre-subnitted questions:
27. If, after hearing the evidence, you came to the
conclusion that the prosecution had not proven the guilt
of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and you found
that a majority of the jurors believed the defendant was
guilty, would you change your verdict only because you
were in the minority?
28. Are there any of you who are not in such a fair
and impartial state of mind that you would not be
satisfied to have a juror possessing your mental state
judge the evidence if you or your loved ones were on
trial here? In other words, would you want someone with
your state of mind sitting as a juror on a case if you
were the defendant?
(R.709).

The trial court declined to ask questions 27 and 28,

because the court was of the opinion that he had already conducted
sufficient voir dire.
Evaluating

the

(R.710).
"totality

of

the questioning,"

State v.

Sherard. 818 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516
(Utah 1992), this Court can see that the trial court abused its
discretion in failing to ask these two questions.
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The voir dire

never addressed whether the prospective jurors felt they were
generally fair and impartial, or whether they would maintain their
independence in the deliberation process, or succumb to pressure
from a majority.
Defense counsel also requested pre-submitted question 10,
which stated:
10. Have any of you see[n] any recent television
programs, or received other information, depicting
attempted adoptions? What did you hear?
Counsel for co-defendant Mr. Vigil informed the court that two
television programs concerning attempted or failed adoptions had
aired approximately one month and one week prior to the trial.
(R.710).

He asked the court to inquire about exposure to the

programs, and the court agreed to do so.

(R.709; 710).

Prospective juror Pepper had seen a program during the week prior
to trial.

(R.715).

The trial court asked him no follow up

questions, but he had already teen stricken for cause.
Prospective
(R.716).

juror

Jerman

had

seen

a

show that winter.

When the court asked Jerman if that exposure to that

information would prevent him from being fair and impartial, Mr.
Jerman said that it would not.

(R.716).

Mr. Jerman had already

been stricken for cause.
Prospective juror Wylie had seen a program somewhere within
six months prior to trial, and had read a magazine article about
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the subject.

(R.715).

The colloquy was as follows:

THE COURT: Let me ask you this question, Ms. Wylie,
As a result of the documentary or the article in the
magazine, and considering the nature of today's case,
would any of that information interfere with your
responsibility to be fair and impartial?
MS. WYLIE: No, not really.
THE COURT: You are certain you could remain fair and
impartial to both sides of this case?
MS. WYLIE: I think, yes.
THE COURT: Obviously, you use the word "think." Do
you have a hesitation?
MS. WYLIE: I don't remember the story in that
detail, you know. I think I can listen impartially.
(R.715-716).
Prospective juror Reese said that she had seen a show called
"Attempted Adoption," wherein a "child was up for adoption and then
their minds were changed and the natural parents got the child
back."

(R.717).

She answered "No," when the court asked, "Would

any of that information interfere with your abilities to be fair
and impartial to both sides of this lawsuit?"

(R.717).

At an unrecorded bench conference prior to the parties'
passing of the jurors for cause, defense counsel objected to the
trial court's refusal to further interview jurors Wylie and Reese
in chambers regarding what television programs they had seen and
how they felt about them.

(R.718, 725).

served on the Vigils' jury-

(R.719).

Both Reese and Wylie

(Trial counsel was under no

obligation to remove them in order to preserve this issue. It was
sufficient to request additional voir dire, and to obtain a ruling.
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State v, Ontiveros. 835 P.2d 201, 204 n.l (Utah App. 1992).

The

trial court opined that the totality of the questions to all
prospective jurors was adequate.

(R.726).

Trial counsel was correct in requesting further voir dire of
the jurors.

In State v. Boyatt. 854 P.2d 550 (Utah App.), cert.

denied. 862 P.2d 1356 (1993), a case wherein the potential jurors
had been victims of crimes similar to those at issue, this Court
stated,

n

[T]he

trial

court

must

adequately

probe

a

juror's

potential bias when that juror's responses or other facts suggest
a potential bias.

The trial court does not abuse its discretion

when, after sufficient questioning, the suggestion of bias has been
dispelled.m

Id. at 552. This holding applies here, wherein two

of the prospective jurors had heard media reports which may have
biased them, and state they "think" they could be unbiased.
This Court has recognized the need for specific voir dire of
prospective jurors in civil cases who have been exposed to similar
media reports.

In Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456 (Utah App. 1989);

Barrett v. Peterson. 868 P.2d 96 (Utah App. 1993); and Evans Yt
Doty- 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App.),fifiEfc.denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1991), this Court has explained that, once preliminary questioning
establishes jurors have been exposed to "tort reform propaganda,91
or media focusing on insurance reforms, prejudice* is established,
and the parties are entitled to more specific questioning to
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determine if jurors bear latent or deep-rooted biases as a result.
Haffin, 772 P.2d at 458-459; Barrett, 868 P.2d at 99-101; Evang, 824
P.2d at 464-46. Given the interests at stake in a criminal case,
trial courts should provide at least as much voir dire as they are
required to provide in the civil arena.

See Haffin at 458 n.2

(intimating that the scope of voir dire in criminal cases might
need to exceed the scope of civil trial voir dire in order to
safeguard the constitutional rights of criminal defendants).
When the trial court found that two of the prospective jurors
had been exposed to programs focusing on similar cases, which the
jurors remembered, under Ha£sn Barrettr and Exans, prejudice was
established and the trial court should have asked more specific
questions to determine if the prospective jurors bore latent or
deep-rooted biases regarding the issues in the case.

See id.

The trial court's perfunctory questions to prospective jurors
Reese and Wylie about whether, in light of the media exposure, they
felt that they could be fair and impartial, were inadequate. Juror
Wylie never gave an unequivocal response to the trial court's
question.

Even if she had, the court should have asked more

meaningful questions so that he and counsel could have assessed the
impact of the media on Ms. Wylie and Ms. Reese.
Utah law has long recognized that trial courts may not simply
accept a juror's assessment of his or her ability to try a case
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fairly; where preliminary voir dire raises a question about the
juror's ability to serve, it is incumbent upon the trial court to
ask probing questions to determine if the juror bears latent biases
which would impair the juror's performance. See State v. Woolleyr
810 P. 2d 440, 441 (Utah App.) , cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah
1991)(when prospective juror has been a victim of a crime similar
to that at issue, an inference of bias arises, which is not
rebutted by a juror's claim that he can be fair and impartial).
Sfifi 3l££ State Vt JongS. 734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987); State v.
HfiMi£t, 689 P.2d 22, 25-27 (Utah 1984); State v. Brooks. 631 P.2d
878, 884 (Utah 1981); Jenkins v Parrishf 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah
1981).
As the Court stated in Evans v. Doty. 824 P.2d 460 (Utah App,
1991),

n

[I]t is not enough for a trial judge to ask questions

merely to discover a potential juror's overt biases.

The judge

must also allow counsel the opportunity to hear responses to
questions that may indicate hidden or subconscious attitudes.
Without such an opportunity, the prospect of impaneling a fair and
impartial jury is diminished.n

Id. at 462.

Reviewing the totality of the questioning, this Court can see
that trial counsel was not afforded adequate information to assess
the prospective jurors.

Because the trial court thus abused his

discretion in conducting the voir dire, a new trial is in order.
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See State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah App. 1992).

POINT 2. THE ERRONEOUS JURY
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
A.

TRIAL COURTS MUST INSTRUCT JURIES
CORRECTLY.

The law governing
substantive

INSTRUCTION

scope,

jury instructions is that "beyond the

correctness

and

clarity

of

the

jury

instructions, their precise wording and specificity is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court.

However, said instructions

must not incorrectly or misleadingly state material rules of law.19
State Vt Sherard, 818 p.2d 554, 560 (Utah App.) cert, denied, 843
P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).

B*

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING
DEFENDANT'S JURY.

Trial counsel objected to the portion emphasized below in the
trial court's jury instruction 28, (R.1170), which provides:
INSTRUCTION NO. 28
Under Utah law, any person, agency, or corporation
may pay maternity expenses, related medical or hospital,
and necessary living expenses of the mother preceding and
during confinement. However, that act of paying is by
law considered an act of charity and may not be made for
the purpose of inducing the mother, parent or legal
guardian to place the child for adoption, consent to an
adoption, or cooperate in the completion of an adoption.
Whether a person consents to the adoption of his or
her child is a personal and private act of that person
and may not be bought or bartered for under the law. A
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natural parent at any time may choose not to consent to
an adoption.
By so choosing, that person does not
subject himself or herself to criminal responsibility
unless vou find from the evidence and bevond a reasonable
doubt each and every element of the offense of Theft by

Deception, as charged in the Information have been
establishedt

(Emphasis added).

The problem with the emphasized portion of instruction 28 is
that it carves out a theft by deception exception from the statute
which mandates that all monies given by prospective adoptive
parents to birth mothers are charitable contributions, which does
not exist in Utah law. Utah Code Ann. §76-7-203 states:
Any person, while having custody, care, control, or
possession of any child, who sells, or disposes of, or
attempts to sell or dispose of, any child for and in
consideration of the payment of money or other thing of
value is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
However, this section does not prohibit any person,
agency, or corporation from paying the actual and
reasonable legal expenses, maternity expenses, related
medical or hospital, and necessary living expenses of the
mother preceding and during confinement as an act of
charity, so long as payment is not made for the purpose
of inducing the mother, parent, or legal guardian to
place the child for adoption, consent to an adoption, or
cooperate in the completion of an adoption.
There can be no theft by deception in the context of an
adoption, because amy money given to the birth mother is a
charitable contribution,

as a matter of

law, and cannot be

consideration for a promised consent to the adoption.

Utah Code

Ann. §76-7-203.
Reliance is an essential element of theft by deception, state
v. Jones. 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982).
22

Even if the alleged victims

were deceived, there was no theft by deception unless they relied
on the Vigils' statements in parting with their money.

Id.

Because the birth parents' consent cannot be bought under Utah Code
Ann. §76-7-203 under any circumstances, the prospective adoptive
parents legally could not rely on the Vigils to consent to the
adoption.
Birth parents cannot deceive, because the object of their
representations, the baby, cannot be sold, and thus has no
pecuniary significance. See Utah Code Ann. §76-6-405(2) ("Theft by
deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to
matters having no pecuniary significance!;.]11).
Any birth parent aware of Utah Code Ann. §76-7-203 would have
a defense to a charge of theft by deception under Utah Code Ann.
§76-6-402(3), which provides, "It is a defense under this part that
the actor: (a) Acted under an honest claim of right to the property
or service involved; or (b) Acted in the honest belief that he had
the right to obtain or exercise control over the property or
service as he did[.]w
Under the plain language of Utah law, the conduct of a birth
mother here cannot constitute theft by deception.

In the event

that the legislature wishes to make conduct similar to that alleged
here a crime, it may do so by adopting a statute which makes it a
crime to accept such charitable contributions if there is no
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present intent to complete the adoption.

In grafting a theft by

deception exception into the charitable donation statute, the trial
court invaded the province of the legislature, and violated the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Statutory

Construction.

section

See generally Sutherland,
46.03

(citations

omitted);

Constitution of Utah, Article V section 1 (separation of powers
provision).

The trial court has further chilled all good faith

efforts to care for expectant birth mothers and their good faith
efforts to place babies for adoption.
The last sentence of Jury Instruction 28 mistakes the law
governing theft by deception, and the court erred in giving it to
the jury. The instruction is the crux of the State's case, and the
jury's receipt of it was highly prejudicial to defendant.

POINT 3.
A.

DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO
PRESENT HER DEFENSE IN A NEW TRIAL..
TRIAL
COURTS
MUST
ALLOW
THE
PRESENTATION OF DEFENSE EVIDENCE.

Every criminal defendant has a federal constitutional right to
present a complete defense to criminal charges against her. SSfi
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1985)("Whether rooted directly in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the
Compulsory Process of confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment,
the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants
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'a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense.' ...

We break no new

ground in observing that an essential component of procedural
fairness is an opportunity to be heard.M)(citations omitted). The
Constitution of Utah provides parallel protection.

An essential

aspect of due process guaranteed by Article I, Section 7 of the
Utah Constitution is the

ff

fair opportunity to submit evidence."

Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945).

"[T]he

defendant's right to present all competent evidence in his defense
is a right guaranteed by the due process clause of our State
Constitution, Art. I# Sec. 7[.]" State v. Hardingr 635 P.2d 33, 34
(Utah 1981).

Article I, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution

guarantees numerous rights to an accused.

It states:

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the

right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to

have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf/ to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. (Emphasis added).
B.

TRIAL COURTS MUST INSTRUCT THE JURY
ON DEFENSE THEORIES.

In instructing the jury, trial courts are governed by the
requirement that "the defendant has a right to have his or her
theory

of

the

case

presented

to
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the

jury

in

a clear and

comprehensible manner."

State v. Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201, 205

(Utah App. 1992)(citation omitted).

C.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING
DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE.

Trial counsel for Mr. Vigil called Roland Oliver to testify
about services offered by adoption agencies.

Upon the state's

objection to the relevance of his testimony, both defense counsel
argued that the evidence was relevant because, had the Vigils gone
through adoption agencies, rather than through attorneys Bushman
and Giffen, who provided inadequate services, the Vigils would not
have proceeded as they did, in continuing to seek out prospective
adoptive couples, and accepting expense monies from three different
couples.

The trial court sustained the relevance objection, and

also excluded the evidence under Rule 403, finding that its
admission might confuse and mislead the jury.

(R.1151-1158).

In this ruling, the trial court forbade both defendants from
presenting their defense. The constitutional provisions prevail,
regardless

of

the

Rules

of

Evidence.

The

United

States

Constitution, Article VI (supremacy clause); Constitution of Utah,
Article

I,

Section

26

(provisions

of

Utah

Constitution

are

mandatory and prohibitory, unless expressly declared otherwise).
The trial court's ruling was also erroneous under the Rules of
Evidence.
26

Utah Rule of Evidence 402, provides for the admission of
"[a]11 relevant evidence

•.. except as otherwise provided by the

Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state
of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable
in courts of this state. ..." Relevant evidence is defined by Utah
Rule of Evidence 401, as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."
Defendants'

[emphasis added]

evidence

regarding

how

adoptions

should

be

conducted, in contrast to the performance of attorneys Bushman and
Giffen, goes directly to the absence of the Vigils' intent to
deceive anyone.

By explaining proper adoption procedures through

Mr. Oliver, defendant sought to demonstrate that the Vigils'
behavior was caused by the inadequate performance of attorneys
Bushman and Giffen, rather than motivated by any intent to deceive.
The trial court's exclusion order was also based on Utah Rule
of Evidence 403, which provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence•
Utah law interpreting this rule demonstrates the error of the trial
court's reasoning. Under Utah Rule of Evidence 403, courts are to
27

presume that relevant evidence is admissible unless the evidence
has

w

an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame or

mislead the jury."
1993).

State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221-22 (Utah

In the event that the evidence fell within such a class,

the proponent of the evidence would then have the burden to show
the unusual probative value of the evidence. 14.
The testimony of Mr. Oliver defendants sought to introduce
would not have an unusual propensity to "unfairly prejudice,
inflame or mislead the jury,19 and its admission should be presumed.
Assuming that the burden were on defendant to demonstrate the
unusual probative value of the evidence, the burden is met.

The

State's proof of deception hinged on the fact that there were
multiple prospective couples involved.

The prosecutor told the

jury that, had there been only one couple who tried to adopt the
Vigil's baby, the State would not have prosecuted the Vigils.
(R.1175; 1308).

The theory of the defense was that it was the

inadequate performance of attorneys Giffen and Bush, rather than an
intent to deceive, that motivated that Vigils to become involved
with multiple prospective adopting couples.

(R.1297-1301).

Evidence was presented regarding the inadequate services
provided by Giffen and Bushman.

However, the vast majority of

this evidence required legal training to appreciate.

Mr. Giffin

vacillated in his testimony regarding whether he represented the
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Vigils or the adoptive couple.
9).

(R.929; 941; Defendant's Exhibit

He was clearly in a conflict of interest.

Mr. Bushman was

initially contacted to find an adoptive family, but he negotiating
to adopt the Vigil baby himself, and then received documents
authorizing him to find another couple to adopt the baby, and in
fact negotiated with another couple to adopt the Vigil baby.
(R.756-762; 772-783; 792).
vague

forms

purporting

Both attorneys had the Vigils sign
to

waive

conflicts

(Defendant's Exhibit 10; State's Exhibit 3).

of

interest.

Mr. Bushman provided

support money for the Vigils out of his attorney trust account, ami
drafted an agreement whereby the Vigils would have to return the
funds if they did not consent to the adoption, in clear violation
of the law.

(R.779-780).

Mr. Bushman, who advertised himself as

an adoption attorney, indicated that the idea that the money to the
birth parents was a charitable contribution was "preposterous" thus
showing an utter lack of knowledge of the law.

(R.769-770). Mr.

Giffen acknowledged having had difficulties with the Vigils,
stemming from the way in which he was dispensing the funds, and
because his assistant failed to obtain timely medical care for Mrs.
Vigil.

(R.938-939; 954).

Had the jurors been allowed to hear about proper adoption
procedures from Roland Oliver, this would have clarified the
deficiencies in the attorneys' performances, which the jurors may
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not have fully appreciated.

The evidence would have supported the

Vigils' defense that their motivation in seeking out successive
couples was a lack of satisfaction with the attorneys, rather than
a desire to deceive.
The trial court's concerns that the evidence might confuse or
mislead the jury underestimate the intelligence of juries and the
importance of giving the jury the information relevant to deciding
the facts.

State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922 (Utah App. 1994),

demonstrates the error in the trial court's analysis. Teuscher was
charged with homicide for the death of a child which occurred while
the child was in Teuscher's day care facility.

At trial, her

attorney sought to exclude evidence of other uncharged instances of
child abuse by Teucher.
Evidence

404(b),

proof

This Court held that under Utah Rule of
of

the

other

crimes

was

entirely

appropriate, inasmuch as the homicide charge to be determined by
the jury required the jury's assessment of intent and absence of
mistake.
In Teuscherr this Court held that the evidence was also
admissible under Rule 403. While evidence of uncharged crimes is
normally considered to be presumptively prejudicial, rstate v.
Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985)], this Court found that the
probative
prejudice.

value

of

the

testimony

TCUSCher at 928.
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outweighed

the

danger

of

The evidence at issue in Teuscher had a far greater danger of
misleading or confusing the jury than did Mr. Oliver's testimony
here.

Unlike the prosecution in Teuscher, the defendant had

constitutional rights to present her defense, so the admission of
this evidence is more strongly required than in Teuscher.
Cross-examination of the state's witnesses was inadequate to
present the defense because Mr. Oliver's testimony went beyond the
possible scope of cross-examination of those witnesses, and because
defendant had the right to call witnesses for her defense.

C£.

State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990)(conviction reversed for
ineffective assistance of trial counsel in part because counsel
failed to call witnesses to bolster the defendant's testimony).
Because Roland Oliver's testimony was relevant, and because
its probative value exceeded its prejudicial effect, the trial
court should have admitted the evidence. While cross-examination
of the State's witnesses did present evidence of the attorneys'
shortcomings,

a

lay

jury

likely

would

not

appreciate

the

significance of the evidence centering on legal technicalities,
such as the serious conflicts of interest. Given the

scarcity of

other evidence available to establish the Vigils' defense to the
intent element of the charges, the trial court's order excluding
Roland Oliver's testimony was prejudicial.
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D.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GIVE REQUESTED DEFENSE INSTRUCTIONS.

Over trial counsels' objection, the trial court refused to
give the jury requested defense Instructions 8 and 9, which quote
portions of Rules 1.7 and 1.8 of the Utah Rules of Professional
Conduct.

(R.1169).

The requested instructions were as follow:
INSTRUCTION NO. 8

(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client will be directly adverse to
another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially limited
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to
a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be adversely affected;
and
(2)
the
client
consents
after
consultation. When representation of multiple
clients in a single matter is undertaken, the
consultation shall include explanation of the
implications of the common representation and
the advantages and risks involved.
(R.295).
INSTRUCTION NO. 9
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business
transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an
ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary
interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which
the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully
disclosed and transmitted in writing to the
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client in a manner which can be reasonably
understood by the client[;]
(2) the client is given a reasonable
opportunity
to
seek
the
advi[c]e
of
independent counsel in the transaction[;] and
(3) the client consents in writing
thereto.
(R.296).
Defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed on her
theory of the defense.

Requested instructions 8 and 9 would have

assisted in elucidating the shortcomings in the performances of the
attorneys, Giffen and Bushman, and thus in explaining why the
Vigils

sought

out

successive

prospective

adoptive

couples.

Particularly in light of the trial court's refusal to allow the
testimony

of

Roland

Oliver

adoptions,

the

absence

pertaining

to

the

of

to

explain

acceptable

norms

the

requested

jury

attorneys'

deficient

performances

in

instructions
was

prejudicial.

POINT 4.
A.

THE ABSENCE OF PROPER DEFENSE
INSTRUCTIONS REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
THE
TRIAL
COURT
SHOULD
HAVE
INSTRUCTED THE JURY ON TWO ASPECTS
OF DEFENDANT'S DEFENSE.

Since Utah law mandates that monies given to birth mothers by
prospective adoptive parents are charitable contributions, and
attorneys Giffen and Fineshriber advised the Vigils that the money
from the prospective adoptive couples was legally considered to be
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a

charitable

contribution,

the

Vigils

were

entitled

to

an

instruction embodying the law in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-402.

It

provides:
.... (3) It is a defense under this part that the actor:
(a) Acted under an honest claim of right
to the property or service involved; or
(b) Acted in the honest belief that he
had the right to obtain or exercise control
over the property or service as he did; or
(c) Obtained or exercised control over
the property or s€*rvice honestly believing
that the owner, if present, would have
consented•
While John Giffen testified that he told the Vigils it was
illegal to accept money from more than one couple, this discussion
occurred in going over a form embodying California LawState's Exhibit 10).

(See

Mr. Giffen testified that he told the Vigils

that Utah law was similar to California's.

Defendant denied the

Vigils ever discussed any such legal concept with Mr. Giffen.
The jury also should have been instructed that n[T]heft by
deception does not occur . • • when there is only falsity as to
matters having no pecuniary significance!;. ]" Utah Code Ann. §76-6405(2).
It was the State's theory that the Vigils deceived the
Bushmans, the Hallidays, and the Elizondos by falsely representing
their intent to give up a baby for adoption.

(R.7-8; 171-172).

For instance, the probable cause statement originally filed in case
number 931901605 provides:

"The Defendants received money from
34

three different couples for the baby and yet never delivered the
child

to

anyone."

(R. 172).

As

a matter

of

law, these

representations had no pecuniary significance. Utah Code Ann. §767-203.

B.
While

THIS COURT
ERRORS.
trial

SHOULD

counsel

did

ADDRESS
not

THE

request

these

defense

instructions, this Court should nonetheless address and rectify the
errors, as plain error and due to ineffective assistance of
counsel•
Under the plain error doctrine, it is appropriate for an
appellate court to address an issue raised for the first time on
appeal if the error should have been obvious to the trial court and
was prejudicial.

State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert.

denied. 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989).

Some errors will be addressed on

appeal even if they should not have been plain to the trial court,
if, in hindsight, the appellate Court recognizes a high level of
prejudice stemming from the error.

Id., 773 P.2d at 35 and n.8.

The plain error standard is not to be applied in an overly
technical fashion; the rule is designed to balance the need for
procedural regularity against the need for fairness.

State v.

Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 122 n.12 (Utah 1989).
The two statutes at issue here should have been obvious to the
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trial court and trial counsel.

The statute limiting theft by

deception to representations of pecuniary significance is the same
statute which defines theft by deception.

The statute setting

forth the good faith defense to the charges is located under the
same part of the Utah Code. The language of the statutes is plain
and unambiguous, and directly supports the defense that both
attorneys were attempting to assert through motions to quash the
bindovers, to dismiss, and arguments to the jury.
The absence of the defense instructions was prejudicial*
There were no true defense instructions given.

There is a

substantial likelihood of a more favorable outcome, had the proper
instructions been given.
This Court should, therefore, address the absence of the
instructions under the plain error doctrine. See State v. Brooksr
868 P.2d

818, 822 (Utah App.)(discussing common standard for

reversal on allegations of plain error and ineffective assistance
of counsel), ££Efc- granted. 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).
In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of
counsel claim pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, a
defendant must show [l] that trial counsel's performance
was deficient in that it 'fell below an objective
standard or reasonableness,' and [2] that the deficient
performance prejudiced the outcome of the trial.
(at page 822). The prejudice prong is established if there is a
11

'reasonable probability' theit, but for counsel's errors, the

result would have been different." Salt Lake City v. Grotepas. 874
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P.2d 136, 138 (Utah App. 1994)(citation omitted).
In considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal, the record must be sufficient for this Court to
decide the issue, and the defendant must be represented by counsel
different from trial counsel. I£. at 822 n4.
Just as the need for the defense instructions should have been
obvious to the trial court, the need also should have been obvious
to trial counsel. The failure to request the instructions cannot
be based upon any conceivable tactical decision, and fell below
objective standards of reasonableness. Given the absence of any
true defense instructions, and given the evidence in this case,
trial counsel's failure to request the instructions was clearly
prejudicial.

See State v. Moritzky. 771 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah App.

1989)(conviction reversed for ineffective assistance of counsel,
who requested defense instruction that failed to incorporate recent
statute beneficial to the defense; court found no conceivable
tactical basis for the omission); Salt Lake City v. Grotepas. 874
P.2d 136 (Utah App. 1994) (conviction reversed because trial counsel
failed to request defense instruction authorized by the Code).

POINT 5. AS A NATTER OF LAM, CHARITABLE
CONTRIBUTIONS CANNOT BE THE OBJECT
OP THEFT BY DECEPTION.
Charitable contributions may not be the object of theft by
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deception, as a matter of law.
Theft by deception is defined by Utah Code Ann, §76-6-405. By
the plain language of the statute, theft by deception does not
occur when the matters which are the subject of the deception have
no pecuniary significance.

As noted above, under Utah Code Ann.

§76-7-203, consent to adopt can have no pecuniary significance.
An element of the offense of theft by deception is reliance by
the victims.

State v. Jones. 657 P.2d 1263 (Ut2ih 1982).

Because

the victims in the context of an adoption cannot rely on the birth
parents to consent to the adoption, as a matter of law, (Utah Code
Ann. §76-7-203), there is no reliance causing them to part with
their money, and theft by deception cannot occur. Jones.
The statute characterizing monies from prospective adoptive
parents as charitable contributions, Utah CPti'3 Ann - §76-7-203,
would also provide a basis for the statutory good faith defenses to
theft by deception provided in Utah Code Ann- §76-6-402(3), cited
above.
Because the facts here cannot constitute the crime of theft by
deception under Utah law, this Court must dismiss this case.

POINT 6.

THE STATUTORY SCHEME AS APPLIED
DEFENDANT IS VOID FOR VAGUENESS.

TO

Defendant, pursuant to Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah State
Constitution is entitled to due process of law. Further, pursuant
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to the United States Constitution, the defendant is also entitled
to due process of law.
If a law or statutory scheme is so vague that it does not
provide adequate notice to a citizen of prohibited conduct which
may give rise to a criminal prosecution, then the statute is void
for vagueness, in violation of guarantees of due process.

Salt

Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975), cert, sign. 425 U.S.
915 (1976).
In this particular case, defendant is advised by one statute
of the State of Utah that monies given to her as a birth mother in
anticipation of adoption are a charitable contribution, and under
no set of circumstances can bind her to the adoption. The logical
extension of this is that no prospective adoptive parent can rely
upon a promise to consent to an adoption.
On the other hand, defendant has been prosecuted for theft by
deception for receiving money under exactly these circumstances.
This whole statutory scheme, as applied to defendant in this case,
is void for vagueness because it does not put a citizen on notice
adequately of potential criminal conduct.
If the legislature wanted to make this clear it could easily
adopt a law similar to the California statute about which defendant
was advised making it illegal to accept money from a prospective
adoptive parent without present intent to consent to the adoption.
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That law does not exit in Utah, however.

Since it does not,

defendant has been prosecuted under a unconstitutionally vague
statutes.

Defendant requests that this case be dismissed.

In the

alternative, she seeks a new trial, wherein the voir dire is
adequate, the jury is instructed properly, and she is allowed to
present her full defense.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of July, 1996.

CORPORON & WILLIAMS

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

NO ADDENDUMS NECESSARY TO THIS BRIEF.
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CORPORON & WILLIAMS

MARY C. CORPORON
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